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SUPERVISION OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT:
THE "OUTSIDE" DIRECTOR AND THE
GERMAN EXPERIENCE
GUENTER H. ROTHt
In October of 1972 Arthur Goldberg, the former Secretary of La-
bor, Supreme Court Justice, and ambassador to the United Nations,
resigned from his seat on the board of directors of Trans World Air-
lines. The reason for the resignation was that Goldberg's attempts to
form an overseer committee consisting of Trans World Airlines' twelve
outside directors, in order independently to review management per-
formance, had met with strong management resistance and had ulti-
mately failed. Goldberg declared that he found it impossible to ful-
fill his legal and public obligations as a member of the board under the
existing conditions.'
The Goldberg incident excited widespread attention beyond the
inner circles of corporation law' and once again spotlighted a crucial
problem of the "modem" widely-held corporation:3 should there be
supervision of management by an independent intra-corporate "watch-
dog" for the benefit of shareholders and perhaps for other groups af-
fected by the corporate enterprise?4 This problem is common to most
countries with a highly industrialized economy based on private cap-
italism, and it is at the same time an area particularly promising for
a comparative law approach, since one can find within the frame-
work of similar enterprise structures basically different legal approaches
t Privatdozent of Law, University of Wuerzburg, Germany. Dr. Roth was a
visiting professor at the University of North Carolina School of Law for spring 1973
term and taught courses in American corporation law and securities regulation.
1. The Goldberg Variation, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1972, at 88.
2. Id. See also Smith, The Goldberg Dilemma. Directorships, Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 7, 1973, at 16, col. 4.
3. It is only this type of corporation, which might be called the American
Telephone & Telegraph or General Motors type, with which we are concerned. For a
discussion of the distinctions to be made between the "modern" widely held corpora-
tion and the shareholder-dominated public corporation see Eisenberg, The Legal
Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57
CALIF. L. Rav. 1, (1969). For a criticism of Eisenberg's criteria see G. RoTH,
DAS TREuHANDMODELL DES INVSTMmTRncsrrs 179 (1972).
In the case of a dominant stockholder the question of management supervision
becomes largely moot, except for purposes of minority stockholder protection.
4. The other groups who might be represented are consumers, environmental
interests, and labor groups.
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to an identical problem. This is true in comparing the German cor-
porate model and the American corporation, and it is for this reason that
for many years German scholars of corporate law, dissatisfied with the
results of their own law and bent on reform, have turned to the United
States in order to study,5 and sometimes to suggest the adoption of,0 the
alternative to be found there. In the United States, on the other hand,
certain ideas seem to be gaining momentum that may result in some-
thing not very different from the German intra-corporate structure,
and at least one American writer expressly suggests adoption of cer-
tain features of the German model.8
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR INTRA-CORPORATE SUPERVISION
The German Supervisory Board
The feature distinguishing the internal structure of the German
Aktiengesellschaft from its American counterpart is found in the Auf-
sichisrat (supervisory board).9 While it is true that both German
and American corporations are characterized by a tripartite structure
(the shareholders, the Aufsichtsrat and a Vorstand under German
law, and the shareholders, the board of directors and the officers under
5. The most recent fruits of such studies are: B. GROSSFELD, AKTISNOESELL-
SCHAFT, UNTERNEHMVENSKONZENTRATON uND KLEINAKTIONAER (1968); E. MESTMAECKEI,
VERWALTUNG, KONZERNGEWALT UND RE HTE DER AXTIONAERE (1958); K. PILuEOER,
NEUB WEGE DER VERWALTUNGSKONTROLLE im AxTIENRECHT (1969); G. RoTm, supra
note 3; R. WIETHOELTER, INTERESSEN UND ORGANISATION DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr IM
AMERIKANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT (1961).
6. See, e.g., R. WIETHOELTER, supra note 5, at 299-314.
7. See the various contributions to the ABA Proceedings on Officers' and Di-
rectors' Responsibilities and Liabilities: Conard, Mace, Blough & Gibson, Functions
of Directors under the Existing System, 27 Bus. LAWYER 23, 24 (Special issue, Feb.
1972); Cary & Harris, Standards of Conduct under Common Law, Present Day Stat-
utes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAWYER 61, 66 (Special issue, Feb. 1972); Vagts,
The European System, 27 Bus. LAWYER 165, 166 (Special issue, Feb., 1972). In addi-
tion, see Conard, Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability, 1972 Durr LJ. 895.
Notice in this context that the German model has proved attractive to the draftsmen of
an EEC convention on the creation of a "European company." See E. STEiN,
HARMONIZATION OF EUROPE N COMANY LAWs 463 (1971).
8. Letter from Thomas J. Schoenbaum to Guenter H. Roth, Apr. 26, 1973.
Professor Schoenbaum's suggestions will be published at a later date.
9. This is one of the four or five substantial differences between German and
American corporate law. The others are the stricter safeguards on capital in the
German corporation (minimum capital requirement, promoters' capital obligations,
restrictions on redemption of shares), the differences in shareholder voting (banking
as opposed to management proxy system, see text accompanying note 48 Infra), and
the American derivative suit. The prerogatives retained by German shareholders
over dividend distribution do not seem to be too important in practice, and the
labor force voice in the enterprise, see text accompanying note 58 infra, is considered
a matter of labor, rather than corporation law.
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American law), only the shareholder elements of the two structures cor-
respond functionally. The Aufsichtsrat does not correspond to the
board of directors, because the authority to "direct the association as a
matter of its own responsibility"'", statutorily vested in the American
board of directors, under the German corporation statute is vested in
the Vorstand. It is the executive body or "board of management".
The Aufsichtsrat, in contrast, is created for the sole purpose of
supervising the management." It is a kind of continuous representa-
tive of the shareholders'" between their meetings' 3 and is the guardian
of shareholder interests; consequently its active participation in
management affairs is limited to some very rare exceptions. '1  The in-
dependence of the supervisory board is maintained by a provision pro-
hibiting simultaneous membership on the board of management and
on the supervisory board,' 5 which is a salient feature if compared to
the relationship between the board of directors and the officers in an
American corporation. The link between the shareholders, the Auf-
sichtsrat and the Vorstand is the same as between the corresponding
institutions in the American corporation: the members of the supervi-
sory board are elected by the shareholders, and the supervisory board
appoints as well as removes (only for cause, however) the members
of the executive body.
The American Board and Its Outside Directors
Considering the actual situation in many large American corpo-
rations, one might be tempted to question the conclusiveness of the
distinction outlined above, or at least the fundamental significance
claimed for it. Not only is there a general shift of effective power of
management from the entire board of directors to an executive group
10. Aktiengesetz (German corporation law) of Sept. 6, 1965, (1965) 1 Bundes-
gesetzblatt 1089 (hereinafter cited as AktG) § 76 (1). For an English translation see
R. Mueller & E. Galbraith, The German Stock Corporation Law (1966).
11. Id. § 111(1).
12. The labor force-the second constituency of the supervisory board, in addi-
tion to the shareholder-is not discussed here. But see text accompanying note 58
infra.
13. See Fischer, Rechtsschein und Wirklichkeit im Aktienrecht, 154 ARciuv FUrR
Dm crviLIsnscHE PRAms 85, 109 (1954); H. SCHUMACHER, DIm ENTWicKLUNG DER
INEREN ORGAISAUON DER AKTIMNGELLSCHA T M DETJTscMEN R Car IBIS zUM
ADHGB 73 (1937); E. SONTAG, Dm AKTmNGESELLSCHAFT nM KAMeFE zwiscHEN
MAciT uD REcIT 106 (1918); 1 SDItNKOMMISSION DES DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGS,
UNTERSUcHUNGEN zuR REFoRM DES UNTERNEHmENsREcHTS 30 (1955).
14. § 111(4) AktG.
15. § 105(1) AktG.
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including the "insider" faction or executive committee of the board,
but there are also indications that even an unemasculated board of
directors should be thought of as an independent supervisory body,
as a "continuous independent link between management and stock-
holders,"1 6 rather than as the center of management. Finally, in the
large enterprise, supervision, functionally speaking, is necessarily in-
herent in top management, with the effective decisionmaking power
being dispersed deeply within the ranks of the so-called techno-struc-
ture.17
But we are not concerned here with the simple truth that the
closer we approach the top of a complex management structure the
more the proportion of supervision of delegated decisionmaking to ac-
tual decisionmaking will increase. What constitutes an independent
supervisory body is its separation from active management, both per-
sonally and institutionally, in order to secure independent judgment and
to preclude conflicts of interest. This requires, on the one hand, the
prohibition of overlapping membership on the management and the
supervisory body, and on the other, strict confinement of the latter to
supervisory functions, as distinguished from management decision-
making, on the other.
As to the first requirement, the American corporation can boast
of a partial separation between its officers and its board members
insofar as its outside directors are concerned and of a complete sep-
aration in the rare cases in which the board consists of non-officer
members only. But it is the second requirement that raises the more
intricate problems, since it is difficult to define the functional rela-
tionship between management and a supervisory body. Of course,
supervision means evaluation of the performance of management, 18
as distinguished from encroaching on management's business discre-
tion or substituting one's own decision for management's. But there
is also the problem of the supervisor's reproof of individual acts or
projects, a censure that is likely to be accompanied by some indication
of what conduct would be preferred, and the even more serious prob-
lem of the supervisor's power to appoint, to reappoint, and eventu-
16. R. GORDON, Busumiss LEADERSHIP IN Tim LARGE CORPORATION 120 (1945).
17. J.K. GALBRAJH, Tim NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 69 and passim (1967).
18. The practical problems involved in the evaluation of management perform-
ance will not be discussed in this article. Of course, supervisory bodies will en-
counter many of the intricacies that already have caused courts all but to capitulate.




ally to remove the management's top personnel. Control over the ap-
pointment of management, or at least the ability to propose candidates
to the shareholders, is a power that is perhaps necessary to make the
supervision meaningful, but at the same time it opens avenues for inter-
ference with active management.
Despite these difficulties, and despite the German Aufsichtsrat's
additional power to participate directly in management matters in
some exceptional cases, the criterion of functional separation of man-
agement and supervision clearly distinguishes the German Aufsichtsrat
from the American board of directors. It is the unmistakable effort at
personal and functional separation that characterizes the Aufsichtsrat
as a supervisory rather than managerial institution. The American
board of directors, in contrast, in light of legislative enactments and
judicial decisions' 9 can hardly be labeled a nonmanagerial body, even
in the exceptional cases of strict separation of board membership and
officers.
On the other hand, in the average board consisting of both inside
and outside directors, all of its members do not participate, or at least
not to the same extent, in managerial functions. We arrive therefore
at a distinction within the board of directors: one group, typically
those forming the executive committee and perhaps serving as officers
at the same time, is part of the management, and a second "outside"
group is not. This does not necessarily imply that the outside direc-
tors in fact serve as management's supervisors, but that role is one of
the few available to them, unless one is prepared to consider them as
entirely useless and superfluous or merely as an instrument for business
contacts and public relations.
Indeed, the courts, though they may sometimes be rather lenient
with regard to the degree of care they expect outside directors to ob-
serve in the discharge of their duties, 0 have never left any doubt that
directors who did not actively participate in the management of the
corporation nevertheless had the duty to supervise management. As
early as 1919, the United States Supreme Court, in holding an outside
director liable for violation of his duties, stressed the outside director's
duty to "exercise the diligence which prudent men would usually ex-
ercise in ascertaining the condition of the business . . . or a reasonable
19. See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853
(D. Del. 1972); Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957).
20. See, e.g., Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Briggs v. Spaulding, 141
U.S. 132 (1891).
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control and supervision over its affairs and officers."21  And the de-
cision in Escort v. BarChris Construction Corp. is well-known for the
strict standard it applied to an outside director's duty "to investigate
the facts."' 2  The liability arose under federal securities law, but the
case is nevertheless an establishment of the supervisory obligations of
outside directors.
The Disinterested Directors of Investment Companies
Finally, there is one special field of corporation law in which the
outside directors have been given an independent supervisory role by
express legislation and in which their function has been institutionalized
to a certain extent. The Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended
in 1970,23 requires in section 10(a) that every investment company
have a board of directors at least forty percent of whom are "disinter-
ested" in the sense of not serving, or having other interests, in the man-
agement of the company. Section 15(c) then subjects any contract
with an investment adviser (the management contract in the case of
an external management)24 and any renewal thereof to the majority
approval of these outside directors. The 1970 amendments added to
Section 15(c) an express provision obliging the directors, in the dis-
charge of this function, "to request and evaluate. . . such information
as may reasonably be necessary to evaluate the terms of any contract
"25
The most important feature of this legislative approach for the
purposes of our discussion is that the outside directors act as an inde-
pendent body, distinct from the insider members and therefore from
the board as such. The parallels to the German supervisory board are
apparent, and the supervisory duties of disinterested directors of in-
vestment companies have not been disregarded by the courts2" or by
legal writers attempting to work out realistic and specific guidelines for
21. Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 511, 513 (1919); see Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), where Judge Learned Hand, with regard
to an outside director, speaks of the "individual duty [of directors] to keep themselves
informed."
22. 283 F. Supp. 643, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
24. External management-the management of the investment company or fund
not by an executive body of its own but by a separate management or so-called ad-
visory company on the basis of a management contract-is the predominant form of
management organization in the field of investment funds.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970).




In light of this common-law and statutory law background, the at-
tempt by Arthur Goldberg to organize the outside directors appears as
just another proposal for creating an independent supervisory body
within the corporation. What Goldberg had in mind when he sug-
gested the formation of an independent body was not the take-over of
active management by the outside directors, 28 but rather the develop-
ment of an organizational framework for a more effective supervision
of active management.
If this interpretation of Goldberg's intentions is correct, those in-
tentions may be linked to ideas outlined nearly forty years earlier by
William 0. Douglas, 29 and they might be understood as a specific an-
swer to Bayless Manning's more general demand to "provide-judi-
cially, legislatively, administratively or by new nongovernmental ma-
chinery-some supervision of management's behavior in corporate mat-
ters . . . ."0 Indeed, the need for providing some institutionalized
supervision of management in the large, widely-held enterprise where
shareholder control has become all but meaningless can hardly be de-
nied; the most recent scandal at Equity Funding Corporation s' is
just another, if extreme, illustration of it. Rather, the problem is how
to make such supervision really meaningful.
THE REALITIES OF SUPERVISION
The American Outside Director
In practice no intra-corporate supervisory mechanism has really
been able to work effectively. With regard to the outside directors of
27. Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 205
(1970); Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated
Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1058 (1967); Nutt, A Study of Mutual
Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1971).
28. I submit that this interpretation, given by Everett Smith in the Wall Street
Journal, supra note 2, is incorrect, although I have to admit that Goldberg's own lan-
guage referring to an overseer committee and its responsibility for the management of
the corporate enterprise is far from unequivocal. Smith's own ideas concerning the
outside director's role, therefore, seem similar to the Goldberg proposal, perhaps with
a somewhat stronger accent on informal and non-obligatory counseling. His allu-
sion to the judge-like character of an outside director corresponds closely to my con-
ception of supervisory functions.
29. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HAv. L. REv. 1305, 1308 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as Directors Who Do Not Direct]; see W. DOUGLAS, DEmocRACY
AND FsN c 49-54 (1940). See also Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern
Corporation, 62 COLum. L. Rnv. 399, 418-19 (1962).
30. Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE LJ. 1477, 1491 (1958).
31. See Wall Street Journal, Apr. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 6,
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American corporations this conclusion is certainly not startling; more
than thirty years ago William 0. Douglas had accused outside directors
of being no more than "business colonels of the honorary type-hono-
rary colonels who are ornamental in parade but fairly useless in bat-
tle."32  Investigations made for the Temporary National Economic
Committee at about the same time reached similar conclusions.83 The
fact that things have not changed in the meantime is not only illustrated
by Arthur Goldberg's spectacular manifestation of discontent over his
lack of power as an outside director, but is also broadly supported
by a recently completed study by Myles Mace. 4
The actions of Arthur Goldberg indicate that it is not a lack of in-
terest or attention on the part of outside directors that should be
blamed for the dilemma in the first place. The outside director can
hardly be expected to function effectively as management's watchman,
not only because of lack of adequate organization and independent fa-
cilities, but because of the more important reason that the outside di-
rector is dependent on management for his position. Management
appoints the outside director through its control of the proxy machin-
ery and can refuse to reappoint him or eventually even have him re-
moved if it so desires.
The firm command that management as a rule retains over the
election of directors is indicated by Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion statistics on proxy solicitation. In 1971, for example, 5,864 soli-
citations of proxies for the election of directors were filed with the SEC,
but only thirty-one companies, or roughly one-half of one percent,
were involved in proxy contests. Of these thirty-one cases management
won seventeen, and non-management opposition succeeded in five
cases.35 (Contests for control of the board and contests for representa-
tion on it are combined.)
There can be no doubt that in the event of a proxy contest be-
tween the inside and the outside directors, the insiders would be in
control of the proxy machinery. In fact, the outsiders would probably
not control it even if they represented a majority of the board of direc-
32. W. DOUGLAS, sup/a note 29, at 46; see Directors Who Do Not Direct.
33. M. DiMoCK & H. HYDE, BURnEucRAcY AND TRUSTFESHIP IN LARGE CoR-
PORATiONS 23-25 (TNEC Monograph No. 11, 1940).
34. M. MACE, DmCroRs-MYTH AN RALrrY (1971); see Conard, Mace,
Blough & Gibson, supra note 7, at 32-37.
35. 37 SEC ANN. REp. 53-54 (1971). The respective figures for the fiscal year
1971-72 are 6,378 elections of directors, twenty-three proxy contests (.35%), with




tors or if the chairman of the board were an outside director, as was il-
lustrated vividly by the events surrounding the case of Campbell v.
Loew's Inc.30
Supervision of Mutual Fund Management
For the reasons mentioned above,37 one might have higher ex-
pectations for the supervisory function of outside directors in invest-
ment companies. However, experience does not support those expecta-
tions. This does not mean that the role of outside directors under sec-
tion 10(a) of the Investment Company Act has no significance at all,18
but on the other hand the outside directors are not the independent and
efficient counter-balance to management the enacters of the Act prob-
ably supposed they would be.8 9 The main reason, once again, is the
control by management (or the investment adviser) of the proxy ma-
chinery. This control is so efficient that when the management com-
panies of even the large "fund complexes" (ten or more invest-
ment companies managed by the same adviser) have so desired,
they have had no difficulty filling the boards of those investment com-
panies for decades with exactly the same persons. The ineffectiveness
of the powers conferred upon the disinterested directors in section
15(c) of the Investment Company Act is indicated by the ease and
the matter-of-course attitude with which the investment advisor's
position has been sold and transferred.
40
Proposals to have outside directors appointed by the SEC41 or to
have the candidates for election nominated by the incumbent outside
directors alone4' have not met with much response. Even under such
conditions it is difficult to see how outside directors could wield any in-
36. 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957); see W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORAuTIONS 274 (4th ed. 1969).
37. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
38. Court decisions like Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381 (Del. Ch. 1961), have
contributed to the sharpening of outside directors' sense for responsibility and poten-
tial liability in recent years.
39. SEC, A STUDY OF MtrruAL FUNDs 466 (1962); Glick, Mutual Fund Man-
agement Fees: In Search of a Standard, 25 Bus. LAWYER 1471, 1482 (1970); Nutt,
supra note 27, at 215-25; Wymeersch, Some Aspects of Management Fees of Mutual
Funds, 17 BuFFALo L. REv. 747, 752 (1968); Note, Conflict of Interest in the Allo-
cation of Mutual Fund Brokerage Business, 80 YALE L.J. 372, 389 (1970).
40. See, e.g., SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958). Po-
tential difficulties in this area are not to be found in section 15(c), but in the enforce-
ment of fiduciary duties. See Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
41. Glick, supra note 39.
42. Nutt, supa note 27, at 216-17.
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fluence with management, given the lack of realistic alternatives to re-
taining the incumbent management in office under practically any cir-
cumstances.
43
The Failure of the German Supervisory Board
Two reasons for the failure of outside directors to act independ-
ently of management, together with the corresponding recommenda-
tions for redress, were stated by William 0. Douglas in 1934:"4 the
lack of separation between supervision and management personnel
and the command by management of the machinery appointing the
outside directors of the corporation. Arthur Goldberg has added a third
reason: the lack of an independent organization and of an autonomous
staff for the supervisors. All three of these reasons are, at least in prin-
ciple and as a matter of law, resolved by the German Aufsichtsrat.
Nevertheless, this institution does not guarantee effective supervision of
management in the interest of shareholders and other legitimately in-
terested groups either.
As far as the members elected by the shareholders are con-
cerned,48 a review of the supervisory board in the widely-held public cor-
poration reveals three typical situations: (1) the Aufsichtsrat is,
functionally speaking, part of the management; (2) it has degener-
ated into an "organization for business contacts and friendships"; 47 or
(3) it exercises effective supervision, but does not represent the stock-
holders.
The Role of Banks. In order to understand this situation more
clearly, it is important to realize that Germany does not have the same
system of shareholder voting that has developed in the United States.
The authority to vote is not conferred upon management in Germany.
43. The writer knows of no case of firing of an old and hiring of a new man-
agement by initiative of the outside directors of a mutual fund. Even in In re Man-
aged Funds, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 313 (1959), a change in the management position took
place only with the help of the SEC.
44. Directors Who Do Not Direct 1314-15.
45. As distinguished from the labor force representatives; see text accompanying
note 58 infra.
• 46. One difference between the American and the German corporate scene is
that in Germany the General Motors type of corporation is relatively less important
though far from negligible; it represents about ten out of the largest fifty and four
out of the largest ten industrial corporations, and in addition the three largest banks.
See Roth, Die Herrschaft der Aktionaere in der Publikums-AG als Gegenstand
rechtssoziologischer Betrachtung, in FsscHnu"r PAruicx - (1973).
47. W. RATHNAu, VoM AKrINwESEN 16-17 (1917).
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But since the small German stockholder is no less indolent than his Amer-
ican counterpart, there exists in Germany a kind of proxy voting, exer-
cised by the banks with whom shareholders have deposited their certi-
ficates. These banks normally represent eighty-five to ninety-five per-
cent of the shares voted at the shareholder meetings of the larger
public corporations.
48
Because the shareholders of a given corporation deposit their cer-
tificates with different banks, one may find as many as fifty banks ex-
ercising the voting rights of shareholders at a shareholder meeting.
However, this rarely results in a diversity of opinions; instead the
banks follow the lead of one or two of the large commercial banks,
who may represent either the largest bulk of votes or an absolute ma-
jority.49  The absence of provisions similar to the proxy regula-
tions under the Federal securities laws5" means that the individual
shareholder has even less of a say than under the American proxy sys-
tem.
As a consequence, banks enjoy a potentially dominant position in
the German corporation, and they have to a large extent usurped the
shareholder's position. This would not in itself necessarily constitute
a negative statement, since a few banks can more effectively exercise
some control over management than myriad diverse stockholders. But
there is the immediate danger that the banks will exercise their power
in pursuit not of the small shareholder's interest, but in pursuit of
their own and possibly conflicting interests. This potential conflict of
interest is a highly controversial subject in Germany51 and has for good
reason been met with some amazement and disbelief on the part of
American observers who are "imbued with the conflict of interest ex-
perience that led to the . . . American legislation separating com-
mercial banking from broker-dealer functions." 52  Such a separation
is unknown in Germany. The neglect by banks of the small share-
holder whose voting rights they exercise is evidenced in their usually
steadfast opposition to attempts to place small shareholder represen-
tation on a supervisory board.
48. See Roth, supra note 46, at
49. At recent shareholder meetings of the three big banking corporations, the
bank itself (i.e., its management) held an average of forty-five percent of the votes,
in one case even fifty-five percent. See id. at -.
50. The one provision of this kind, AktG § 135 (1) (2), envisages only a particu-
lar case.
51. See G. RoTH, supra note 3, at 308-13.
52. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German,
80 HARv. L. R v. 23, 62-63 (1966).
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On the other hand, it does not necessarily follow from the po-
tential power of banks that they always effectively control a corpora-
tion. While it is true that the top executives of the banks account for
approximately one-third of the shareholder-elected members on the
supervisory boards of large corporations, 3 it is equally true that share-
holder meetings as a rule approve management proposals by a mar-
gin of 98 to 99.98 percent.54 These management proposals are norm-
ally unanimously supported by both the management board and the
supervisory board, and it is difficult to assess the degree to which
the supervisory board (and its bank members) influences the actual
decisionmaking. But, in conclusion, it does seem that the banks, not
unlike American institutional investors, are inclined to abandon their
power in favor of the management of the corporation so long as the
overall conduct of the business is satisfactory, thus creating a situation
that in essence is not very different from the American corporate scene.
Management and Supervision. One effect of the role of banks
described above is that management usually is able to elect its candi-
dates to the remaining positions on the supervisory board. 5  Manage-
ment uses this ability mainly for one of two purposes: either it uses
the board as a liaison and public relations institution, as a source of ad-
vice at best, or as a dumping ground for veteran executives (similar to
the outside faction of the American board), or it extends itself beyond
the management board into areas of the supervisory board. It might,
for example, appoint several of its senior members to positions on this
board rather than the management board. This is similar to the
close relationship between inside directors and officers in an American
corporation, except that the provisions prohibiting simultaneous mem-
bership are formally observed.56
Secondly, instead of being controlled by the supervisory board, the
management more often seems able to control the supervisory board
53. See G. RomH, supra note 3, at 309.
54. See id. at 186-87; Roth, supra note 46, at
55. E. MESTMAECKER, supra note 5, at 91; 1 STUDINKOMMISSION DES DEUTSCIfN
JURISTENTAGs, supra note 13, at 30, 76; Schilling, Macht und Verantwortung in der
Aktiengesellschaft, in FnSTsCan'r GEsSLER 159, 163 (1971). For additional refer-
ences see R. WiETaOELTER, supra note 5, at 295-97.
56. In addition to the literature cited in the previous footnote see Fischer, supra
note 13, at 110-11; K. P'LuEGER, supra note 5, at 71-75; W. RATHmNAu, supra
note 47, at 14-15; Hachenburg, Vom Aktenwesen im Grossbetrebe, 1918 JuSTISCHE
WocHENscmFr 16, 17. For recent empirical material see Mitbestimmung hn
Unternehmen, in VI/334 BUNDESTAGs-DRUCKSACHE 32-33 (1970) (the so-called
"Biedenkopf opinion").
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even if the management does not itself occupy positions on the latter.
This is partially a consequence of management's influence on the elec-
tions to the supervisory board, and partially a result of an accomo-
dation between management and the banks represented on the super-
visory board. In the individual case, it is impossible to determine the
extent of the accomodation or the relative strength of each party, but
the result is that in the absence of some serious crisis management is a
self-perpetuating oligarchy that regenerates itself by means of co-
optation rather than by supervisory board selection. There are cases in
which members of the management were refused reelection or were
removed by the supervisory board, it is true,57 but it is difficult to de-
termine whether the impetus for removal originated within the su-
pervisory board or within the management itself.
Management domination of the supervisory board seems even to
be reenforced to a certain extent by labor participation (or "co-deter-
mination") on this board, which is the second original feature of the
German Aufsichtsrat. The employees of the enterprise elect one-third,
or in particular cases one-half, of the supervisory board members. 58
The co-determination, particularly when amounting to parity, could
serve as a potentially powerful instrument for labor unions against
both the management and capital owners of the corporation. However,
a recent study made for the German government suggests that labor rep-
resentation on the supervisory board more often is an ally of manage-
ment in confrontations with the shareholder representatives on the
board, rather than an independent pressure group.59
The identification of labor representatives with management sug-
gests a better explanation for the constant failure of intra-corporate
supervision of management than those discussed above. For despite
the conflicts of interest of banks and management's influence on the
selection of supervisory board members, strong-minded and inde-
pendent outsiders are occasionally elected to the supervisory board. It
is under these favorable conditions that one might expect the German
Aufsichtsrat to provide some effective supervision of management,
superior to the supervisory system in the American corporation, but
unfortunately this seems in fact to be the result in only rare cases.
57. See, e.g., Vagts, supra note 7, at 168, describing the Volkswagenwerk situa-
tion.
58. A recent and very accurate account of the German co-determination legisla-
tion is to be found in Wall Street Journal, Feb. 23, 1973, at 1, col 1.
59. Mitbestimmung im Unternehmen, supra note 56, at 36-37,
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Instead, the odds are that the powers inherent in the supervisory
board and the enticements corporate leadership may offer to such
highly qualified persons, be they capital or labor representatives, will
result in a type of psychological metamorphosis that has best been de-
scribed by Detlev Vagts as the "gravitational attraction of manage-
ment."6  These men will become part of the management, not be-
cause they were appointed to the board in this capacity, but because
they imperceptibly begin to identify themselves with the objectives of
management.
CONCLUSION
Neither the concept of outside directors in any of its different
forms nor the German Aufsichtsrat lives up to the needs for effective
supervision of management. The usefulness of outside directors and
German supervisory board members in contributing their valuable per-
spectives and outside business contacts is not questioned, but this role
should not be confused with supervisory functions. The German ex-
perience shows that even expectations of supervisory control based on
the separation of supervisory and management personnel, the estab-
lishment of independent facilities, and the attempt to control the elec-
tion machinery by the supervisory body are not well-founded. Even
under such circumstances the supervisory body will be unable to coun-
terbalance the dominance of management within the corporation.
If one desires supervision in the proper sense of the word, one
additional step becomes indispensable: the separation of the supervi-
sory body not only from management, but also from the enterprise it-
self, and the organization of the supervisory body on a supra-corporate
level. This seems to be the only way in which to prevent identification
with management.
On the other hand, it would not be desirable to abandon com-
pletely the advantages of intra-corporate supervision. The solution
might be found in the establishment of a governmental agency sim-
ilar to the Securities and Exchange Commission or in the establishment
of a self-policing, industry-wide association. Members of the agency
or association, as salaried and full-time professionals, would be as-
signed to individual corporations, and a system of rotation would pre-
vent the above-mentioned danger of identification with management.
60. Vagts, supra note 52, at 61.
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In view of the general opposition to governmental or quasi-gov-
ernmental intrusion into private enterprise, the negative response of
business to any suggestion like the above can be anticipated. How-
ever, in my opinion public control of private capitalism, or at least of
the corporate giant, will increase in any event, in both Germany and the
United States. Be that as it may, increased public control over private
corporations is the price one may have to pay to achieve effective supervi-
sion of corporate management in the large public corporation.

